Introduction
A giant chasm lies between the theory and the practice of informed consent. On the one hand, in terms of theory, scores of appellate court opinions and medical ethics codes describe informed consent in terms of honoring and supporting patient autonomy and self-determination. After all, the doctrine of informed consent is supposed to assure that the patient's preferences and values match the medical interventions the patient gets.
On the other hand, in terms of practice, this laudable goal is rarely actually achieved. The doctrine of informed consent has been a part of U.S. law for decades. But it has failed to meaningfully empower patients to make diagnostic and treatment decisions that match their preferences. Too frequently, clinicians fail to appropriately elicit their patients' preferences. Too frequently, the interventions that clinicians administer are unwanted by the patients who receive them. 1 Virtually all clinicians aspire to excellence in diagnosing disease. Unfortunately, far fewer aspire to the same standards of excellence in diagnosing what patients want. A powerful recent report shows that "preference misdiagnosis" is commonplace. 2 Moreover, clinicians are rarely even aware that they have made a preference misdiagnosis. It is the "silent misdiagnosis." 3 Perturbing illustrations of preference misdiagnosis are easy to find. Recent studies measuring the quality of patient consent report downright alarming results. 4 For example, a 2014 study of patients scheduled for elective cardiac catheterization found that 88% of patients held fundamentally mistaken beliefs about the potential benefits of the procedure, despite having signed an informed consent document. 5 Similar examples abound. Only 19% of patients with colorectal cancer understood that chemotherapy was not likely to cure their cancer. 6 Only 10% of spine clinic patients could answer basic questions about their spinal surgery. 7 Only 5% of cancer patients understood essential aspects of their diagnosis. 8 Only 3% of patients scheduled for percutaneous coronary intervention understood that procedure. 9 There is no reason to think these studies are unique outliers. 10 The failure rate exceeds 90%. This is not cause for mere consternation or concern. It is cause for horror and dread. It seems that the quality of physician patient communication is often so poor, that patient consent cannot fairly be described as "informed." 11 If patients do not understand their options, then they cannot form or express relevant preferences about those options. 12 Fortunately, policymakers are building a new "bridge" to narrow the gap between the theory and practice of informed consent. That bridge is being built with patient decision aids (PDAs). These evidence-based educational tools include decision grids, videos, and interactive websites. 13 Already, over 130 randomized controlled studies show that PDAs help patients gain significant knowledge and understanding of their choices. 14 The evidence on PDA effectiveness is substantial. But their use remains mostly limited to investigational trials. It is time to move PDAs from research to practice, from the laboratory to the clinic. Taking the lead on this challenge, Washington State has begun "certifying" PDAs. 15 Certification incentivizes PDA use by assuring clinicians, patients, and payers that its information is accurate, up-to-date, complete, and understandable. 16 Washington State serves as a model for other states and for the federal government to follow. 17 To better appreciate both the current state of informed consent law and where it is heading next, it is helpful to examine informed consent law within a broader historical context. Accordingly, I recount the complete evolution of informed consent law in the United States. I do this by dividing the evolution of informed consent law into five epochs. These five epochs do not map neatly onto a precise chronological account. But they do correlate to fundamentally different legal approaches.
In sections I and II, I describe the antecedents of informed consent. In section I, I start in the 1800s. Before the 20th century, physician paternalism prevailed. Patient consent, much less informed consent, was no part of American medicine. But this began to change by the early 1900s.
In Section II, I show that there was growing judicial recognition of patient autonomy between 1900 and 1920. During the Progressive Era, appellate courts across the United States held that it was a tortuous battery for clinicians to administer a diagnostic or treatment intervention to a patient without any authorization. Compared to the paternalism of the 1800s, this was an important advance for patient rights. But it was a small one. The "consent" required under medical battery doctrine was minimal and bare.
In Section III, I explain that not until the 1970s did clinicians have a duty to help assure that patient consent was voluntary. Not until the 1970s, did clinicians have a legal duty to assure that patients understood the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the procedures they authorized. In short, not until the 1970s, did courts recognize the doctrine of "informed consent." I explain the elements of tort based informed consent law. While informed consent was an undeniable landmark in the development of patient rights and bioethics, it was hardly a panacea. I conclude by describing the doctrine's key limitations.
In Section IV, I show that as major gaps in informed consent law were recognized, legislatures frequently made attempts to "plug" those gaps on an ad hoc basis. Particularly over the past decade, an increasing number of states have mandated clinicians to make specific disclosures in specific situations. Unfortunately, these mandated disclosures have been limited stop gap measures. Legislatures simply lack the resources and agility to cover the waterfront of diagnostic and therapeutic interventions.
In contrast, the certification of patient decision aids (PDAs) heralds a more systematic and revolutionary approach to remedying the defects of informed consent law. They are considerably more fluid and dynamic than legislative or regulatory mandates. In Section V, I describe PDAs and the extensive data demonstrating their effectiveness. I also explain that despite the robust data on the positive impact of PDAs, they remain rarely used in clinical practice.
Finally, in Section VI, I argue that translating PDAs from research to treatment requires certification. I To better appreciate both the current state of informed consent law and where it is heading next, it is helpful to examine informed consent law within a broader historical context. Accordingly, I recount the complete evolution of informed consent law in the United States. I do this by dividing the evolution of informed consent law into five epochs. These five epochs do not map neatly onto a precise chronological account. But they do correlate to fundamentally different legal approaches.
II. Medical Battery
By the beginning of the 20th century, this overt medical paternalism gave way to (at least limited) legal recognition of patient autonomy and self-determination. This shift was most famously illustrated and captured by Justice Cardozo in 1914: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages." 21 Notably, by the time Justice Cardozo wrote his opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, he was able to cite to other appellate authority. 22 Courts across the United States had already begun to recognize claims for "medical battery." 23 These cases confirmed that a physician may not administer treatment without the patient's consent, notwithstanding either "good" motives or "good" results. 24 
A. Elements of Tortious Battery
Battery is a simple tort with just two elements. 25 Medical battery is even simpler. The clinician is liable for battery, if: (1) he or she "acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person" and (2) "a harmful [or offensive] contact with person of the other directly or indirectly results." 26 Intent is broadly defined "to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act as well as the situation in which the defendant merely believes the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." 27 Today, medical battery is a well-established intentional tort. 28 And the elements have barely changed over the past 100 years. In short, a battery is established when the clinician acts without any consent whatsoever. And a battery is also established when the clinician acts outside the scope of the patient's consent, whether spatially, temporally, or otherwise. 29 Intent is easy to establish. The clinician knows that intervention is harmful or offensive. Many of these procedures are "highly intrusive, and some are violent in nature." 30 Even if the procedure is not harmful, the clinician at least knows that, without consent, the treatment would be offensive, infringing on a patient's reasonable sense of personal dignity. 31 It does not matter how skillfully or successfully the intervention is provided. 32 It does not matter that the administration of treatment is (objectively) beneficial on balance. 33 Nor does it matter if the clinician's intent was to benefit the patient. 34 Instead, whether that treatment constitutes a "benefit" is a value judgment for the patient to make. 35 In short, neither "good" motives nor "good" results are relevant to a finding of battery. 36 
B. Limitations of Medical Battery
A cause of action for battery is particularly attractive to a plaintiff 's attorney. First, she does not need to establish a standard of care. 37 Consequently, she does not need to retain any expert witnesses. 38 Second, while the plaintiff likely will be able to prove actual (economic or non-economic) damages, she does not need to establish any. 39 She can recover nominal and punitive damages without showing any compensatory damages. 40 Third, she need not navigate tort reform procedural hurdles such as damages caps and prefiling review. 41 Fourth, the prospect of damages sends a very powerful signal, because a judgment or settlement may not be covered by insurance. 42 Nevertheless, medical battery recognizes a rather narrow and limited patient right. It focuses solely on whether the patient minimally authorized medical treatment, not on whether the patient actually understood the risks, benefits, and alternatives to that treatment. For example, a patient who agreed to undergo spine surgery would have no claim for battery even if the physician failed to disclose a significant (say 20%) risk of paralysis. In short, battery focuses on only the bare existence of patient consent, not on its quality or substance.
III. Informed Consent Law
It was not until the 1970s that U.S. courts began to widely recognize and articulate an entirely separate and independent legal theory, "informed consent." 43 Under this doctrine the patient concedes that she minimally authorized the medical treatment at issue. Thus, the administration of that treatment is not a battery. Instead, the patient claims that her consent was not sufficiently voluntary. The patient asserts that she would not have consented, if the physician had disclosed certain information regarding the treatment's risks, benefits, and alternatives. 44 In essence, the patient claims that her consent was procured by the physician's negligent failure to disclose information about risks, benefits, or alternatives to treatment. The patient claims that the physician's failure to disclose is a form of medical malpractice. In this section, I first describe tort based informed consent law. I then outline four major limitations on the ability of informed consent law to protect patient rights.
A. Tort Based Informed Consent Law
Informed consent is typically based in the state common law tort doctrine of negligence. 45 Failure to obtain a patient's informed consent is a form of medical malpractice. 46 The patient must establish the standard elements of a tort cause of action: duty, breach, injury, and causation.
duty of disclosure
The first element in an informed consent action is the duty of disclosure. There is general agreement that physicians should give the patient the following information: (a) the nature and purpose of the proposed intervention, (b) the intervention's probable risks and benefits, and (c) alternative interventions and their risks and benefits.
But the exact scope and extent of this disclosure varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The states are almost evenly split between two disclosure standards: (1) the malpractice (aka "physician-based," "professional" or "custom-based") standard and (2) the material risk (aka "patient-based" or "lay") standard. 47 The malpractice standard requires physicians to provide the information that a (hypothetical) reasonably prudent physician would disclose in the same circumstances. This disclosure duty is measured by the standards of the medical profession. In most of these jurisdictions the physician's disclosure duty is measured by a nationwide standard of care. The physician must disclose the information that a reasonable physician in the United States would disclose under the circumstances.
But in a significant number of states the physician's duty is measured in one of three geographically narrower ways: (a) strict locality, (b) statewide, or (c) same or similar community. 48 In other words, the physician's duty to disclose is measured by what information would be disclosed under the circumstances by a reasonable physician: (a) in that town, (b) in that state, or (c) in town like the treating physician's town.
While the malpractice standard is physiciandefined, the material risk standard is patient-defined. It requires physicians to provide the information that a (hypothetical) reasonable patient would consider significant in making a treatment decision. This disclosure duty is not controlled by the medical profession. Instead, it is measured by the patient's presumed need for information. 49 The contrast between the two dominant disclosure standards is nicely illustrated by recent events in Wisconsin. For decades, Wisconsin had followed the "material risk" standard for informing a patient. 50 But in December 2013, the Wisconsin legislature passed a bill that amended Wisconsin's informed consent statute, overruling a long line of Wisconsin State Court cases. 51 The new statute adopts the weaker "reasonable physician" standard.
Therefore, instead of a Wisconsin physician's duty being measured by what a reasonable person in the patient's position would want to know, it is now measured by what a "reasonable physician in the same or a similar medical specialty would know and disclose under the circumstances." 52 In its plain language analysis of a rule implementing the new statute, the Medical Examining Board observes that this duty "is not as broad as the former standard and in fact lessens the burden on physicians." 53 2. breach, injury, and causation Establishing the scope and content of the physician's disclosure duty is only the first element in an informed consent action. In both malpractice and material risk jurisdictions, the patient must satisfy three additional elements: (1) breach, (2) injury, and (3) causation.
First, the patient must establish breach. She must show that the physician failed to disclose what she had a duty to disclose. In the easiest cases, the physician admits that she failed to make the requisite disclosure. In the toughest cases, the patient must overcome the presumption established by the physician's contemporaneous medical record notes that she made the disclosure. 54 Second, the patient must establish injury. She must show that she was harmed as a result of the treatment. Even if the physician failed to disclose a risk that she had a duty to disclose, the patient has no cause of action unless that risk actually materialized.
Third, the patient must establish causation. This element has three subparts. The patient must show: (a) that had the physician made the appropriate disclosure, the reasonable person would not have consented to that treatment; (b) that she herself would not have consented to the treatment; and (c) that not undergoing the treatment would probably have avoided the injury. 55 
B. Limitations of Informed Consent Law
The doctrine of informed consent is an important milestone in the history of bioethics and patient rights. 56 But over the past two decades it has become increasingly clear that the traditional informed consent process is seriously deficient. 57 It often fails to ensure that patients have the information and understanding that they need to make truly informed decisions regarding their medical treatment. 58 In part, this failure was inevitable.
The doctrine of informed consent suffers from at least four limitations that significantly impede patient empowerment. (1) The scope of the duty to disclose is narrow. (2) Objective causation ignores individual preferences and values. (3) The goal of informed consent is only disclosure, not understanding. (4) Informed consent protects only physical injuries.
scope of the duty to disclose is narrow
The first major limitation of traditional informed consent doctrine is that the required informational disclosures are themselves circumscribed and modest. In around half of U.S. states the physician's duty to disclose is measured by professional custom, by what the reasonable physician does or would disclose under similar circumstances. But the professional custom governing the informational exchange may be parsimonious and severely restricted. 59 Moreover, even to the extent that the professional custom is to disclose, the informational content of that disclosure may not be evidence based. 60 In other words, the prevailing custom and practice may be to disclose inaccurate information.
In the other half of U.S. states, the physician's duty is measured by what information a hypothetical "objective" patient would deem important under the circumstances. While more patient-focused than the malpractice standard, the objective nature of the material risk standard is still hindering. 61 It fails to recognize that patients have different preferences and that they value risks and benefits very differently. 62 In other words, this material risk standard, while patient-based, is almost always defined by reference to what an objective hypothetical patient would consider material, not to what information any specific patient would consider material. Indeed, two or three states have found the objectivity in this standard insufficiently protective of patient autonomy. So, they have adopted a pure subjective standard. 63 Their rather compelling rationale is that " [t] o the extent the plaintiff, given an adequate disclosure would have declined the proposed treatment, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have consented, a patient's right to self-determination is irrevocably lost." 64 
objective causation ignores individual preferences and values
The second major limitation of traditional informed consent doctrine is the "objective" causation requirement. A patient suing for negligence based on a claim of inadequate informed consent must establish more than the physician's breach (failure to disclose). She must also establish causation: that the injury probably would have been avoided through disclosure, because the informed hypothetical reasonable person would have chosen differently.
In other words, it is not sufficient for the patient to prove that they would have not chosen the procedure had the defendant accurately conveyed its risks. The plaintiff must also prove that the "reasonable patient"
The first major limitation of traditional informed consent doctrine is that the required informational disclosures are themselves circumscribed and modest.
In around half of U.S. states the physician's duty to disclose is measured by professional custom, by what the reasonable physician does or would disclose under similar circumstances. But the professional custom governing the informational exchange may be parsimonious and severely restricted. would have also chosen otherwise. 65 This is a demanding and difficult standard to satisfy. An objective inquiry wrongly presumes that there is always one best option. Indeed, sometimes, there are situations in which one single treatment is "correct" or clearly indicated above all others by the available medical evidence. 66 But there is often more than one good option, more than one reasonable path forward. 67 With respect to this "preference sensitive treatment," the balancing of benefits and harms is heavily valueladen. 68 Current informed consent law fails to recognize these common situations.
Take, for example, the birth of a child with a disorder of sex development. Is it a boy or a girl? Should there be surgery? What kind? When? 69 In such instances, there is more than one good option, more than one reasonable path forward. Similarly, take patients with a herniated disk that causes back and leg pain. Patients must weigh the quicker fix that surgery may bring against the risks of surgery. 70 The best course of treatment for a particular patient depends on that patient's preferences, values, and cultural background.
Consequently, commentators have called for courts and legislatures to abandon the "objective" causation standard in the context of informed consent suits. They argue that it should be replaced with a standard that recognizes the importance of the individual patients' values and preferences. 71 Under this standard, instead of determining whether the hypothetical reasonable patient would still have consented with disclosure, the jury determines only whether this particular patient would still have consented. 72 3. goal is only disclosure, not understanding The third major limitation of traditional informed consent doctrine is that the focus is only on disclosure, not on patient understanding. The physician's duty is only to "deliver" certain information to the patient, not to ensure that the patient actually receives and appreciates it. 73 The underlying assumption is that given the information, the patient "will be able to identify the information that is relevant to her choice and will be in a position to make a decision aligned with her values and goals (i.e. she will 'know what to do')." 74 In other words, informed consent works like the "mailbox rule" in contract formation. 75 The general rule is that a contract is made when acceptance to an offer is dispatched, even if the letter of acceptance is lost and never reaches the offeror. Contract acceptance is deemed to be fully communicated when the offeree has placed his acceptance in the course of transmission to the offeror. 76 Similarly, in informed consent law the physician fulfills her duty by making a disclosure, even if it is not understood or meaningfully "received" by the patient. Indeed, the "letters" of informed consent are often lost in the "mail." While the patient may receive the envelope, she does not get the message inside. Even when physicians (technically) make required disclosures, they often convey risk data through extemporaneous conversation, which is not an effective means of communication. Over 40 years ago, the California Supreme Court warned about fulfilling informed consent through "lengthy polysyllabic discourse." 77 But that is still the primary means of physician-patient communication.
In short, there is a massive incongruence between the medical interventions administered and patients' desires for those interventions. 78 Despite its name, "informed consent" fails to assure that the patient's consent is actually informed. It fails to assure that relevant patient questions and concerns are adequately answered.
only physical injuries are protected
The fourth major limitation of traditional informed consent doctrine is that it protects patients only from physical injuries, not from financial or dignitary detriments. 79 Just as patients can be physically harmed but not legally wronged by iatrogenic injuries when there is no negligence, they can be wronged but not physically harmed when there is inadequate informed consent.
For example, suppose the patient consented to knee replacement surgery without understanding her options. 80 If the surgery is physiologically successful, then the patient has no remedy. It does not matter that the patient has incurred both expense and discomfort in exchange for a "benefit" that she would not consider worth the "costs" had she been fully informed. 81 
IV. Mandated Disclosures
The limitations of traditional informed consent law have been well documented. Consequently, lawmakers have increasingly recognized that traditional informed consent law has failed to assure that patients are engaged in the decision making process. It has failed to assure that patients understand their medical treatment choices. To address this gap, state legislatures began enacting statutory disclosure mandates for a number of diagnostic and treatment situations.
For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, physicians were not disclosing less invasive treatment options to their breast cancer patients. 82 In response, 14 states enacted statutes that require physicians to present the advantages, disadvantages, and risks of all medically viable alternative therapies. Some of these statutes even require use of "standardized written information." 83 More recently, many states have increasingly enacted informed consent statutes itemizing exact information that must be disclosed under specific circumstances. 84 One of the most common mandates concerns end-of-life treatment options. To provide a sense of this legal approach to informing patients, I describe end-of-life disclosure mandates in some detail. I then more briefly describe some other new disclosure mandates.
A. Statutorily Mandated Disclosures Related to Endof-Life Counseling
A number of studies have determined that individuals nearing the end of their lives often do not receive the care that they want or need. They are frequently unaware of the full range of options, including hospice and palliative care services. 85 Nondisclosure of diagnostic and prognostic information remains common. 86 The evidence of gaps seems overwhelming. For example, only 31% of patients with advanced cancer had end-of-life discussions. 87 Worse, even when these discussions do occur, they happen very late. 88 Earlier advance care planning discussions are correlated to earlier hospice referral, better patient quality of life, and better family bereavement. 89 But many patients never get these benefits, because end-of-life discussions happen late or not at all. 90 In response, a growing number of states have enacted statutes that require physicians to provide terminally ill patients with "comprehensive information and counseling regarding end-of-life options." These mandates are of two basic types: (1) those focused on clinicians, and (2) those focused on healthcare facilities.
information and counseling from clinicians
In 2009, both California 91 and Vermont 92 enacted "right to know" legislation in the context of end-of-life care. Since then, both New York (in 2010) 93 and Massachusetts 94 (in 2012) have enacted similar legislation. Arizona considered similar legislation in 2013. 95 The New York and Massachusetts statutes both mandate that:
If a patient is diagnosed with a terminal illness or condition, the patient's attending health care practitioner shall offer to provide the patient with information and counseling regarding palliative care and end-of-life options appropriate for the patient, including but not limited to: the range of options appropriate for the patient, the prognosis, risks, and benefits of the various options; and the patient's legal rights to comprehensive pain and symptom management at the end-of-life. 96 This information and counseling may be provided orally or in writing. 97 If a health care provider is unwilling or unqualified 98 to provide the statutorilymandated information and counseling regarding palliative care and end-of-life options, Massachusetts and New York require the provider to "arrange for another physician or nurse practitioner to do so, or [] refer or transfer the patient to another physician or nurse practitioner willing to do so." 99 Importantly, while the California disclosures are triggered only "upon the patient's request," New York law states that providers "shall offer to provide" the mandated information and counseling. And, unlike California, the New York statute includes civil and criminal penalties.
disclosures required from health care facilities
States have adopted statutes and regulations mandating disclosures not only by clinicians but also by health care facilities regarding their end-of-life or palliative care policies. 100 For example, in 2011, New York expanded on its 2010 Palliative Care Information Act by enacting the Palliative Care Access Act. 101 This law requires hospitals, nursing facilities, home health agencies, and special needs and enhanced assisted living facilities to provide patients with advanced life-limiting conditions and illnesses with access to information and counseling regarding options for palliative care, including pain management consultation.
More recent notable developments are from Maryland and Massachusetts. In 2013, Maryland enacted legislation establishing at least five "palliative care pilot programs" in hospitals around the state. 102 This legislation impacts end-of-life counseling by requiring pilot program hospitals to establish policies and procedures that "provide access to information and counseling regarding palliative care services appropriate to a patient with a serious illness or condition" and that "require providers to engage in a discussion of the benefits and risks of treatment options in a manner that can be understood easily by the patient or authorized decision maker." 103 Massachusetts's 2012 right to know statute, discussed above, applies not only to clinicians. It also includes a provision requiring the Department of Public Health to develop regulations guiding health care facilities' distribution of information to patients or residents regarding palliative care services. 104 In 2013, the MDPH began the process of promulgating regu- Basically, the MDPH proposed requiring these facilities to distribute to appropriate patients in its care, culturally and linguistically suitable information regarding the availability of hospice and palliative care. The MDPH later clarified that this informational obligation must be fulfilled by providing the patient with either an MDPH-issued informational pamphlet or a facility-created informational pamphlet. 105 MDH implemented the regulations in 2014. 106 
enforcement of information and counseling mandate
There is limited data measuring the impact of these end-of-life disclosure mandates. But at least one lawsuit has resulted in a settlement. In September 2009, Michelle Hargett Beebee, a 43-year-old mother of three young children, was diagnosed with advanced pancreatic cancer. Her pain and symptoms escalated quickly, and soon after Michelle was referred to hospice care at Vitas, the nation's largest for-profit hospice chain. Michelle entered Vitas hospice in November 2009, with the goal of bringing her pain and symptoms under control and to have a peaceful death. Instead, Michelle died in misery.
In 2010, Michelle's family sued Vitas, alleging, among other things, that the hospice was negligent for failing to inform Michelle about medications that would have eased her acute pain. 107 The Complaint specifically referenced the new California right to know law. In early 2014, Vitas and the Hargetts were able to resolve to their mutual satisfaction the issues raised in the lawsuit. 108 4. disclosure mandates on patient rights at end of life Most end-of-life disclosure mandates focus on the risks, benefits, and alternatives to medical treatment. But a growing number focus on apprising patients of their rights. Three notable examples are from Michigan, Oklahoma, and Washington.
In 2013, Michigan enacted legislation requiring a "health facility or agency" to, if requested by a patient or resident or prospective patient or resident, "disclose in writing any policies related to a patient or resident or the services a patient or resident might receive involving life-sustaining or non-beneficial treatment within that health facility or agency." 109 This law does not require Michigan health facilities to adopt certain policies regarding life-sustaining or non-beneficial treatment. It focuses solely on the issue of disclosure. 110 In 2014, Oklahoma enacted the Medical Treatment Laws Information Act. 111 This law requires the State Board of Medical Licensing and Supervision to prepare a disclosure statement to inform patients and families of their rights under the Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act and other Oklahoma treatment statutes. Among other things, the law assures that patients know if they or their surrogate directs life-preserving treatment, their health care provider may not deny it except under narrow conditions. This Oklahoma disclosure statement must include contact information for officials to whom violations can be reported. Furthermore, the Medical Treatment Laws Information Act requires that healthcare entities covered by the Patient Self Determination Act must distribute this disclosure statement with its PSDA notices. 112 Finally, in late 2013, responding to a directive from Governor Inslee to improve transparency for consumer information, the Washington Department of Health enacted rules that bring any change in control of a hospital under the Certificate of Need process.
Due to mergers spurred by the Affordable Care Act, the percentage of Washington State hospital beds in religiously affiliated (mostly Catholic) hospitals rose from 25% in 2010 to nearly 50% in 2014. Catholic health systems are required to follow the Ethical and Religious Directives promulgated by the United States Conference of Bishops. 113 These directives forbid many reproductive and end-of-life health services, including contraception, vasectomies, fertility treatments, tubal ligations, abortion, Death with Dignity, and advance directives that are contrary to Catholic teachings. Consequently, facilities that affiliate with Catholic health systems are often required to restrict health services and information on the basis of religious doctrine. 114 The new rules require that, among other things, all Washington hospitals must submit to the WDOH its policies related to access to care in the areas of admission, non-discrimination, end-of-life care, and reproductive healthcare. 115 The WDOH must post a copy of these disclosed policies on its website. 116 This is supposed to enable consumers to know which hospitals are asserting conscience-based objections. 117
B. Other Disclosure Mandates
End-of-life counseling is not the only area in which disclosure mandates have been proliferating. Particularly with controversial procedures, policymakers want to ensure that the patient's choice is voluntary and informed. Five notable examples are: (1) medical aid in dying, (2) abortion (3) telehealth, (4) vaccination opt-outs, and (5) other mandates. 1. medical aid in dying California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington affirmatively authorize medical aid in dying. All six statutes are nearly identical. 118 All six require the physician to make a number of specific disclosures, including: (1) the patient's medical diagnosis; (2) the patient's prognosis, with an "acknowledgement" that any statements of life expectancy are only an estimate and that "the patient could live longer than predicted"; (3) the range of appropriate treatment options; (4) the range of feasible end-oflife options, including palliative, hospice, and comfort care; (5) the range of possible results associated with taking the prescribed medication; and (6) the probable result of taking the prescribed medication. 119 
abortion
Perhaps nowhere has there been more legal activity regarding informed consent than with respect to abortion. And nowhere else is such regulation so controversial. Other legislative interference in the physician-patient relationship (like that related to end-of-life counseling) seems warranted by persistent defects in informed consent. In contrast, mandates focused on pregnant women appear to be driven by partisan aims. 120 Many disclosures are factually inaccurate. 121 Consequently, many statutorily mandated disclosures related to abortion have been challenged as unconstitutional. 122 
telehealth
Telehealth services are emerging as an important alternative to in-person consultations with physicians and other health care professionals, particularly in rural areas. 123 As telehealth services grow in scope and popularity, questions have emerged regarding informed consent required for telehealth services.
In addition to the usual risks associated with a physician-patient encounter, telehealth services involve risks associated with remote communication, including the potential for an equipment or technology failure, which could result in misdiagnosis. 124 Telehealth services also raise unique data security and confidentiality concerns. 125 And there are obvious limits to the comprehensiveness of examination. Accordingly, some states have imposed additional or heightened requirements for informed consent. 126 
vaccination opt-outs
Across the county many parents and guardians assert personal beliefs opposed to vaccination for their children. 127 Several states have recently enacted statutes to ensure that these individuals understand the benefits of vaccination and the risks of forgoing vaccination.
For example, Colorado enacted a statute requiring the completion of an educational module as a requirement for a non-religious exemption from the vaccination requirement. 128 Similar requirements were recently enacted in California, 129 Oregon, 130 Vermont, 131 and Washington. 132 5. other disclosure mandates While most recent statutorily mandated disclosure laws relate to end-of-life options, aid in dying, abortion, telemedicine, and vaccination; these are not the only disclosure mandates. 133 Over the past few years, state legislatures have also proposed or enacted informed consent laws addressing a variety of other subjects, including: (1) prescription drugs, (2) investigational products, (3) breast density, (4) scope of practice limitations, (5) egg donation, and (6) hospital observation status. 134 
C. Limitations of Disclosure Mandates
Disclosure mandates are a popular solution to the problems of informed consent. But they suffer from four major limitations: (1) insufficient resources, (2) political corruption, (3) political opposition, and (4) a near-exclusive focus on content at the expense of clarity and explanation.
First, legislation or regulation is hardly workable for the broad range of medical interventions that patients receive every day. Rulemaking processes are too slow and cumbersome to address more than a handful of interventions. Moreover, these same processes are too slow and cumbersome to assure that mandated disclosures remain accurate and up-to-date. 135 Second, disclosure mandates are sometimes not evidence-based. Sometimes, they were initially evidence-based but became outdated. 136 Sometimes legislatures act too quickly to address salient but poorly understood risks. 137 Other times, the information in the disclosure mandate was never evidence based. These mandates were enacted to "steer" patients to a particular choice rather than to empower the patient to make choices that align with her own preferences and values. 138 Third, even when they are evidence based, disclosure mandates are vociferously opposed. To the consternation of some medical professionals, the trend toward legally mandated disclosures appears to be growing. 139 A number of medical associations have advocated against legislative interference with patient care and the patient-physician relationship. 140 Fourth, disclosure mandates only address one part of the problem with informed consent. They focus on only the content of physician-patient communication. At best, disclosure mandates help to clarify and to assure "what" is disclosed. But they fail to address "how" it is disclosed. They neglect the manner in which the information is conveyed. 141 Compelling evidence indicates that they simply do not work. 142 
V. Patient Decision Aids
In contrast to the deficiencies and limitations of disclosure mandates, patient decision aids (PDAs) herald a more systematic and revolutionary approach to remedying the defects of informed consent law. In contrast to the one-way disclosure focus of informed consent, in "shared decision making" the patient and physician engage in two-way interactive discussion and reflection, in personalized bilateral conversations. 143 Patient decision aids (PDAs) are an important tool that can inform and guide these discussions.
After first describing the nature of PDAs, I summarize some of the extensive evidence demonstrating their effectiveness. Numerous studies show that "shared decision making" meaningfully empowers patients. But despite robust data on the positive impact of PDAs, they remain rarely used in clinical practice. I conclude this section by reviewing federal and state efforts to promote wider use of PDAs. In the next section, I examine certification as a key way to promote PDAs.
A. Definition of Patient Decision Aid
Patient decision aids are evidence-based educational "tools" that help patients do three things. 144 First, PDAs help patients understand the various treatment options available to them, including the risks and benefits of each choice. Second, they help patients communicate their beliefs and preferences related to their treatment options. Third, PDAs help patients decide with their clinicians what treatments are best for them based on their treatment options, scientific evidence, circumstances, beliefs, and preferences. 145 PDAs take various forms. They include educational literature with graphics, photographs, and diagrams. They also take the form of decision grids, videos, and website-based interactive programs such as sequential questions with feedback. 146 PDAs might even include "structured personal coaching." 147 No matter what form they take, the best PDAs provide an appropriate presentation of the condition and treatment options, benefits, and harms. They have three key advantages over the traditional informed consent process. First, the information in the PDA is accurate, complete, and up-to-date. Second, the PDA presents the information in a balanced manner. Third, the PDA conveys the information in a way that helps patients understand and use it. PDAs are truly patient-centered.
In short, by using PDAs, patients gain significant knowledge and understanding of their choices. For example, a PDA could help a pregnant woman who previously had a cesarean section to determine if she is a good candidate for a vaginal birth after cesarean. Importantly, despite their typically self-directed and self-paced nature, PDAs do not supplant physicianpatient conversation about treatment options. Instead, they supplement it, by better preparing patients to engage in that conversation. In other words, PDAs should not be equated as constituting shared decision making. Instead, PDAs are the facilitator to the essential bilateral communication between provider and patient which is the crux of shared decision making. 148 One physician explains:
PDAs will allow me to have a very different discussion with my patients. PDAs do a better job than I can at helping patients understand their options. I then have more time to explore the issues that matter most to them and understand how their condition impacts their lives. 149 In short, PDAs allow physicians to focus their patient communication efforts more effectively. 150 Decision aids are already available for a large number of conditions, including breast cancer, prostate cancer, osteoarthritis, and childbirth. 151 And many more decision aids are being developed by both nonprofit and for profit companies as well by as government entities. 152 Non-profit developers include: Advance Care Planning Decisions, 153 Decision Box, 154 Healthwise, 155 the Informed Medical Decisions Foundation, 156 the Mayo Clinic, 157 the Option Grid Collaborative, 158 and the University of Sydney. 159 For-profit developers include: Dialog Medical, 160 Emmi Solutions, 161 Health Dialog, 162 Krames StayWell, 163 the Patient Education Institute, 164 the NNT, 165 and Welvie. 166 Government developers include the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 167 and NHS Right Care. 168 
B. PDAs Are Very Effective
In contrast to the deficiencies and limitations of traditional informed consent, robust evidence shows that shared decision making meaningfully empowers patients. 3 In contrast to traditional informed consent, shared decision making deliberately takes into account both the best scientific evidence available, as well as the patient's values and preferences. 169 PDAs meaningfully inform and guide both of these elements. First, PDAs provide relevant information on healthcare options, helping patients gain significant knowledge and understanding of their choices.
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Finally, PDAs prompt reflection, helping patients to form and clarify their values and preferences. 170 PDAs thereby enhance deliberation by helping patients discover and associate their values and preferences with their healthcare options, and then communicate those associations to their provider. Together, the provider and patient make a treatment choice that aligns with the patient's values. PDAs help make the patient engaged, equipped, empowered, and enabled. 171 Randomized controlled trials are considered the most reliable form of scientific evidence in the hierarchy of evidence that influences healthcare policy and practice. Over 130 RCTs demonstrate that PDAs significantly enhance patients' knowledge of treatment options, risks, and benefits. 172 Summarizing the benefits identified in these RCTs, a recent Cochrane review concluded that using PDAs can lead to patients: (1) gaining knowledge; (2) having a more accurate understanding of risks, harms and benefits; (3) feeling less conflicted about decisions; and (4) rating themselves as less passive and less often undecided. 173 In short, once patients understand their choices, they are better able to align their care with their preferences and values.
C. PDAs Reduce Cost and Liability
Furthermore, PDAs do more than improve patient knowledge and satisfaction. They also reduce the cost of care. 174 Patients using PDAs are more likely to choose conservative treatment options. For example, they are less likely to choose surgical interventions. 175 They are less likely to be admitted to the hospital. 176 And they are less likely to choose CPR. 177 One study estimates that implementing decision aids for just eleven procedures would yield $9 billion in savings over ten years. 178 That is real value: improved patient satisfaction at lower cost.
Using PDAs can reduce not only healthcare costs but also healthcare liability. Most immediately, PDAs can reduce liability for informed consent claims, because they help assure that the patient gets appropriate information. But the liability benefits of PDAs do not stop there. PDAs can also reduce claims based on other theories of medical malpractice. 179 Commentators and insurers have long recognized communication failures as an important source of malpractice litigation. 180 If patients are well-informed of potential risks, then they are less surprised (or angry) when those risks later materialize. Well informed patients have less decisional regret and take more ownership of their own decisions. 181 Significant evidence indicates that patients do not typically bring malpractice suits simply because they have bad outcomes. They bring lawsuits when those bad outcomes are accompanied by bad feelings. Those bad feelings can be avoided with good patient communication. 182 In short, PDAs improve the quality of physician-patient communication. Better communication means lower liability exposure. 183 In sum, using PDAs produces four important benefits: (1) they protect and promote patient autonomy; (2) they reduce medical errors and bolster patient safety, (3) they reduce healthcare costs, and (4) they reduce malpractice claims. Influential healthcare organizations from the Institute of Medicine to the Joint Commission have recognized these benefits. 184 And they have encouraged the widespread adoption of PDAs.
For example, in its influential 2001 Crossing the Quality Chasm report, the Institute of Medicine recommended greater use of decision aids to ensure that patients' treatment decisions are consistent with their preferences and values. 185 In 2014, the Institute of Medicine again reviewed the literature on shared decision making in clinical practice and reaffirmed the value of PDAs. It found that PDAs "trigger the robust communication that is necessary for shared decision making to occur." 186 
D. Few Clinicians Use PDAs
Despite robust evidence of effectiveness and despite influential recommendations to expand PDA use, widespread adoption has not happened. The use of PDAs has "not become the norm." 187 They remain "seldom adopted" 188 and "rare in everyday practice." 189 The research is here. But implementation remains sparse and incomplete. 190 "Practice lags behind" the evidence. 191 Indeed, in light of its earlier endorsements, the Institute of Medicine recently lamented that "the promise of shared decision making remains elusive." 192 Others agonize that the potential of PDAs remains "unrealized." 193 In short, a key challenge is to move PDAs from research to use, from the laboratory to the clinic. 194 But making this move is not easy. Even patently superior medical interventions are often slow to get adopted. 195 For PDAs, the challenges may be even greater. Perhaps the most significant hurdle to implementation is the need to incentivize and train clinicians to use PDAs. 196 Two pervasive physician and system-level barriers have been summarized as "professional indifference" and "organizational inertia." 197 Other barriers include lack of physician comfort, time constraints, competing priorities, lack of reimbursement, perceived burden, and cost. 198 Importantly, one barrier is intrinsic to the nature of PDAs: they reduce and constrain physician discretion and judgment. One of the key motivations for using PDAs is to convey more complete, up-to-date, and balanced information than patients are now receiving. But physicians may react negatively to this "intrusion" in much the same way that they have reacted to mandated disclosures. 199 
E. Legal Efforts to Promote PDA Use
Given that patient decision aids are a relatively recent development in clinical practice, it is not terribly surprising that there is relatively little government oversight of the development and use of such tools. 200 But there have been some efforts to "break the logjam" and facilitate the implementation of PDAs as a routine part of clinical practice. 201 Three initiatives are notable. First, the federal government has spurred the development of PDAs through several grant programs. Second, the federal government has even built PDA use into reimbursement criteria for some procedures. Third, some states have also moved to promote PDA use through consumer websites, demonstration programs, and licensing criteria.
federal pda promotion through grants
The most notable source of federal law that directly deals with PDAs is Section 3506 of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The express purpose of Section 3506 is to facilitate shared decision making. 202 It aims to do this in three ways.
First, Section 3506 directs the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to develop a mechanism to certify PDAs. Second, Section 3506 promotes the development and clinical use of PDAs by directing DHHS to make grants or contracts to develop, update, produce, and test patient decision aids and to "educate providers on the use of such materials." 203 Third, Section 3506 directs DHHS to provide grants for the implementation and effective use of decision aids. 204 As discussed below, the Center for Medicare Services (CMS) has not yet moved forward on the first aim by selecting an entity to certify patient decision aids. 205 However, CMS has moved forward on supporting the initiation of decision aid demonstration projects. For example, MaineHealth and the Mayo Clinic have been selected as "Shared Decision Making Resource Centers" to "disseminate best practices and other information to support and accelerate adoption, implementation, and effective use" of decision aids." 206 Furthermore, there are a number of other federal programs that authorize the funding of research on decision aids. 207 For example, Section 3021 of the ACA establishes the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). 208 The CMMI is charged with testing and evaluating "innovative payment and service delivery models" to identify approaches that will provide cost savings or improve the quality of care for populations served by Medicare, Medicaid, or the Children's Health Program (CHIP). 209 CMMI tests and evaluates models to determine if they either decrease program costs without reducing the quality of care, or increase the quality of care without increasing spending. When CMMI identifies such models, it has the authority to promulgate rules implementing these models on a nationwide basis, through federal health programs. 210 One of several models specifically identified by Section 3021 as an opportunity for CMMI to address costs or quality of care is in assisting individuals to make "informed health care choices by paying providers of services and suppliers for using patient decisionsupport tools" that "improve applicable individual and caregiver understanding of medical treatment options." 211 Thus, it is likely that CMMI will address payment and delivery models involving patient decision aids. 212 Indeed, part of CMMI's work has involved the funding of grants to organizations that will implement "the most compelling ideas to deliver better health, improved care, and lower costs to people enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid, and Children's Health Insurance Program." 213 In 2012, CMMI awarded the first batch of these "Health Care Innovation Awards." While none of the awarded projects appear to specifically focus on patient decision aids, multiple projects address the larger issue of shared decision making and probably involve the use of PDAs. 214 Like CMMI, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has also promoted the development and implementation of PDAs. The AHRQ Effective Health Care Program funds "effectiveness and comparative effectiveness research for clinicians, consumers, and policymakers," including multiple studies related to development, testing, or implementation of PDAs. 215 Additionally, this program has made several PDAs ("plain-language guides") publicly available, including for post-menopausal osteoporosis and "clinically localized" prostate cancer. 216 A separate potential source of federal funding for the development, testing, or implementation of patient decision aids, is the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI). 217 The ACA mandated the establishment of PCORI as a non-governmental, non-profit corporation, and charged it with funding comparative clinical effectiveness research. 218 This will increase the availability and quality of evi-journal of law, medicine & ethics dence that patients and health care providers need to make "informed health decisions."
In May 2012, PCORI indicated that one of its national priorities for research funding will be "communication and dissemination research," including support of "shared decision making between patients and providers." 219 This strongly suggested that PCORI would support decision aid research. PCORI's subsequent award of its first cycle of grants has confirmed this. Of 25 grants initially awarded, at least two directly deal with assessing the efficacy of PDAs for improving medical decisions by patients and their families. 220 2. federal pda promotion through payment incentives While the federal government has not established criteria or processes for the certification of PDAs, it has incorporated shared decision making as a quality measure benchmark into several programs. 221 And it continues to more broadly incorporate shared decision making into other conditions of participation and conditions of payment. 222 For example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services issued two proposed Decision Memos that would predicate payment on a shared decision making visit and use of one or more decision aids. 223 The first CMS decision memo concerns screening for lung cancer with low-dose computed tomography scan imaging (LDCT). 224 Medicare will cover this annual preventive screening only if the patient has a "shared decision making visit" that includes "the use of one or more decision aids."
The second CMS decision memo concerns left atrial appendage closure devices. 225 Before Medicare will pay for such devices, the patient must have a "formal shared decision making interaction with an independent non-interventional physician using an evidencebased decision tool." Since private payers typically follow Medicare reimbursement models, shared decision making will spread even more widely. 226 More broadly, shared decision making is one of 33 performance standards in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). 227 Specifically, Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) must "promote patient engagement" by addressing "shared decision making that takes into account the beneficiary's unique needs, preferences, values, and priorities."
Under the MSSP, groups of physicians, hospitals and other health care providers contract with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to accept responsibility for the "quality, cost and overall care" of an assigned group of Medicare beneficiaries. 228 To incentive these ACOs to provide quality, cost-efficient care, providers will continue to be paid under the Medicare fee-for-service model, but will be eligible for "shared savings" payments if the ACO meets certain cost and quality benchmarks. 229 One of the quality benchmarks required of ACOs is that these organizations "define processes to promote… patient engagement." 230 CMS regulations issued in 2011 clarified this requirement, explaining that measures that would promote patient engagement "may include, but are not limited to, the use of decision support tools and shared decision making methods with which the patient can assess the merits of various treatment options in the context of his or her values and convictions." 231 Most recently, in December 2016, CMS launched a pair of demonstration projects aimed at evaluating different approaches to shared decision making between physicians and patients. The Shared Decision Making Model will focus on integrating this approach into clinical workflow in ACOs. The ACOs will receive $50 per SDM service delivered by their practitioners. The Direct Decision Support Model will use outside "decision support organizations" to educate patients about their treatment choices so they can have informed conversations with their physicians. 232 3. state pda promotion through consumer websites, demonstration projects, and licensing rules Since patient decision aids both improve care and reduce costs, federal policymakers have not been the only ones incentivizing their use. State policymakers have also been enacting legislation and administrative regulation that promotes the use of decision aids. 233 Most notable among these states is Washington. As discussed in the next section, Washington has already implemented a mechanism to certify PDAs. 234 But other states have taken some smaller steps to incentivize the use of PDAs. Notable among these are Massachusetts, Vermont, and Maine.
In 2012, Massachusetts established a Center for Health Information and Analysis. 235 Among other things, this Center must "maintain a consumer health information website containing "information comparing the quality, price and cost of health care services." The statute mandates that, to the extent possible, this website must include decision aids "on but not limited to, long-term care and supports and palliative care."
In 2009, Vermont enacted legislation calling for a shared decision making demonstration project. 236 In 2010, the Vermont Blueprint for Health commenced a one-year shared decision making pilot in the Barre Hospital Service Area. 237 Similarly, in 2009, Maine enacted legislation calling for an "advisory group of stakeholders" to "develop a plan to implement a program for shared decision making." 238 In 2011, the group issued its final report, recommending a demonstration project. 239 At the regulatory level, in 2010, the Maine Board of Licensure in Medicine incorporated shared decision making principles into its guidelines on informed consent. 240 That same year, the Minnesota Department of Health incorporated such principles into its certification requirements for Health Care Homes. 241 Several other states have also explored promoting the use of decision aids. In 2016, New Jersey considered a bill that would provide Medicaid coverage for advance care planning. 242 The bill defined "advance care planning" as including the physician:
facilitating shared decision making with the patient, making use of: decision aids; patient support tools, provided in an easy-to-understand format which incorporates patient preferences and values into the medical plan; an advance directive; and a physician order for life-sustaining treatment, as appropriate. 243 Legislation has also been considered in Connecticut and Oklahoma. 244 In Minnesota, bills in 2009 and 2011 proposed requiring shared decision making for certain surgical procedures before reimbursement could be paid by a health plan company under contract with the state commissioner of human services or finance. 245 More legislation and regulation is sure to be considered and enacted by additional states over the next few years.
While the measures taken by these states may help to promote the use of PDAs, they are insufficient. They fail to address the preliminary issues of exactly which PDAs clinicians should use. Not all PDAs are created equal. Therefore, more PDA use is not necessarily better -unless the PDAs are accurate, up-to-date, and unbiased. To assure this, we need certification.
VI. Certification of Patient Decision Aids
There is a plethora of PDAs. And there is a plethora of PDA developers. 246 Unfortunately, they are highly variable in their competence and motives. Some PDAs may not include all the relevant risks, benefits, and alternatives. Some may include them all but fail to present them in a fair and balanced manner. Indeed, sometimes a slanted presentation is intended, because the PDA developer has an interest in steering the patient to a particular treatment. For example, a pharmaceutical company and an insurer might have very different PDAs for the same intervention.
Which PDAs should clinicians use? We need a process for assessing and evaluating PDAs. We need a way to determine whether a PDA is a source of reliable health information that can help in decision making. After first explaining the need for PDA certification, I describe its origins in private expert collaboratives. I then describe the new certification criteria and process now implemented in Washington State. I conclude by examining the case for federal PDA certification.
A. Need for Certification
The relative newness of PDAs means that there is little systematic oversight of their development or use. While PDAs have been promoted as a positive movement toward both more meaningful informed consent and more cost-effective care, there is also an emerging recognition that some kind of quality-control measures are needed to ensure that PDAs do not do more harm than good. 247 The purpose of PDA certification is to help drive the evolution of informed consent from a one-way (disclosure-oriented) process to a two-way (participationoriented) shared decision making process. "Providers will be more comfortable using [PDAs] that have gone through some kind of independent vetting or certification process." 248 Certification improves and incentivizes the use of PDAs by assuring their quality. 249 It is a formal process that ensures their integrity. This is important, because "patients, clinicians, and payers need to be assured that the [PDAs] they choose to use have been developed in a legitimate manner and carefully scrutinized for quality and transparency." 250 PDA certification helps assure that evidence-based criteria are met and conflicts of interest are mitigated. 251 The risks are significant. There is a real "possibility of the introduction of poor quality tools." 252 As discussed above, numerous for-profit, non-profit, and government developers have produced a multitude of PDAs. 253 Unfortunately, they are widely diverse in quality. Many are incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading. 254 Many are not supported by evidence of effectiveness. 255 Consequently, just as drugs and devices must be approved by the Food and Drug Administration to ensure that they are safe and effective, here too, regulatory oversight is needed to ensure that PDAs meet a minimum level of quality and safety. 256 Indeed, a bad PDA can be just as dangerous as a bad drug or device. Several features of PDAs increase the likelihood of misinformation or bias, relative to other types of patient educational materials. 257 First, PDAs are generally developed by third parties not involved in a patient's care, including professional associations, government agencies, hospitals and health centers, non-profit organizations, and for-profit companies. 258 Some of these developers "have little incentive to main-journal of law, medicine & ethics tain the integrity of their products other than market pressures to maintain good business practices." 259 But in other contexts, such as environmental regulation, products liability, and pharmaceuticals; it has become clear that market pressures are often insufficient to protect consumers. 260 Second, PDAs are "powerful tools that can influence clinical care decisions." 261 Some developers have a financial conflict of interest to direct the patient toward a particular option. 262 The American Medical Association has expressed concern about the use of PDAs "by insurers and others" as a vehicle to steer patients toward less expensive treatment options on the basis of biased or misleading information. 263 Third, the potential for the creation and use of biased or misleading decision aids is exacerbated by the fact that PDAs are generally used by patients outside interactions with their physicians, meaning that "physicians may have limited opportunities to mediate or interpret the information" provided by third parties. 264 Fourth, further complicating the issue is the fact that PDAs are commonly used in medical decisions that "involve moral and political controversies that may impact the way information is provided to patients," (e.g. reproductive issues). 265 The interaction of these elements raises concerns of quality and objectivity that are not yet addressed in a systematic way by private or government oversight. 266 
B. Origins of PDA Certification
Fortunately, there is a growing recognition of the need for some kind of formal credentialing process. 267 A few nongovernmental organizations have already begun compiling and assessing the quality of available patient decision aids. 268 Notable among these efforts is the International Patient Decision Aid Standards Collaboration (IPDAS). This group of researchers, practitioners, patients, policymakers, and other stakeholders from more than a dozen countries around the world was established in 2003 to enhance the quality and effectiveness of PDAs. 269 To this end, IPDAS has developed a detailed set of evidence-based criteria to guide evaluation of the quality of decision aids. 270 These include: (a) describing the health condition, (b) listing the options, (c) listing the option of doing nothing, (d) using visual diagrams, (e) using stories that represent a range of positive and negative experiences, (f ) reporting the source of funding used to develop the materials, and (g) describing the quality of scientific evidence presented.
Similar to IPDAS, the Ottawa Hospital Research Institute (OHRI) has compiled a library of decision aids that meet a few basic criteria. To be included in OHRI's database, a decision aid must: (a) provide information about the "options and outcomes that are relevant to a patient's health status;" (b) must report the date it was most recently updated and be no more than five years old; (c) must "provide references to scientific evidence used;" (d) must report conflicts of interest; and (e) must be publicly available. 271 But IPDAS and OHRI are mere private organizations. Neither has been formally recognized as a certifying entity in the way that, for example, the Joint Commission is widely recognized by state licensing authorities. 272 They have no legal authority to promulgate certification standards, much less evaluate and certify specific PDAs. This means that, at the moment, the issue of patient decision aids is largely devoid of oversight or standardization. The notable exception is Washington State.
C. Certification in Washington State Is Already Here
Washington State, seizing the opportunity to promote shared decision making, has moved forward with PDA certification. It began with a series of statutes enacted between 2007 and 2012. Then, in 2015, the state Health Care Authority (HCA) drafted certification criteria and built a certification process. In 2016, it issued a call for proposals and began certifying PDAs. Finally, Washington State is not only certifying PDAs but also is incentivizing clinicians to use them.
legislative and regulatory foundations
In 2007, the Washington State legislature found that there is "growing evidence that, for preferencesensitive care… patient-practitioner communication is improved through the use of high-quality decision aids that detail the benefits, harms, and uncertainty of available treatment options." 273 So, the legislature enacted legislation that called for a demonstration project. 274 The goal of this demonstration project was to "increase the extent to which patients make genuinely informed, preference-based treatment decisions, by promoting…the development, certification, use, and evaluation of effective decision aids." 275 The demonstration project was a success. So, in 2011, Washington enacted further legislation, directing the HCA to convene a joint working group, the Robert Bree collaborative, to "identify health care services for which there are substantial variations in practice patterns or high utilization trends." 276 For such services, the statute directs the collaborative to "consider strategies that will promote improved care outcomes, such as patient decision aids." 277 In 2012, Washington enacted a third statute. The 2007 legislation had anticipated the emergence of a "national certifying organization." 278 Since that still had not happened five years later, the legislature outlined a state-specific process for certifying decision aids. 279 Specifically, the legislature empowered the Chief Medical Officer of the Health Care Authority to independently assess and certify PDAs.
By the end of 2012, the HCA had already promulgated regulations defining the process by which it would certify PDAs. 280 Basically, these regulations authorized the HCA medical director to establish minimum scores in three categories: (1) content criteria, (2) development process criteria, and (3) effectiveness criteria, based on the IPDAS Collaboration criteria. 281 The 2012 regulations also authorized the HCA to charge a "certification fee" to defray the costs of assessment and certification. 282 But despite these regulations, the HCA still did not have a specific process or criteria for certification. Fortunately, in 2014, Washington State won a State Innovation Models grant from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to bring shared decision making into mainstream clinical practice. And the project received additional financial support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. So, finally, in 2015, with the requisite resources in place, the HCA proceeded to draft certification criteria and create a certification process. 283 
building the criteria and process
In 2015, the HCA drafted tentative certification criteria based on the IPDAS standards. 284 It then convened more than 60 stakeholders (including providers, payers and consumers) to provide feedback on those draft criteria. In April 2016, the HCA published its certification criteria. 285 They require that the PDA adequately:
• Describe the health condition or problem to gain or lose by choices patients make using the PDA • Include authors/developers' credentials or qualifications • Provide date of most recent revision (or production) 286 The Washington State certification criteria further ask whether the PDA and/or the accompanying external documentation (including responses to the application for certification) adequately:
• Disclose and describe actual or potential financial or professional conflicts of interest • Fully describe the efforts used to eliminate bias in the decision aid content and presentation • Demonstrate developer entities and personnel are free from listed disqualifications 287 • Demonstrate that the Patient Decision Aid has been developed and updated (if applicable) using high quality evidence in a systematic and unbiased fashion • Demonstrate that the developer tested its decision aid with patients and incorporated these learnings into its tool 288 
implementing the certification process
In April 2016, the HCA began accepting PDAs for certification. It prioritized PDAs relating to obstetrics and maternity care. Over the next few years, the HCA has prioritized the certification of PDAs for orthopedic, cardiac, and end-of-life care. The HCA is publishing a list of certified PDAs upon completion of each certification process. By summer 2016, the HCA had already completed the certification process and certified several maternity-related PDAs, including "Prenatal Genetic Testing: Understanding Your Options"; "Amniocentesis Test: Yes or No?"; "Pregnancy: Your Birth Options after Cesarean"; and "Pregnancy: Birth Options if Your Baby is Getting Too Big." 289 The HCA began the next round of PDA reviews in early 2017. and other states. But Washington State did not stop there. It further incentivizes the wider use of PDAs in two important ways. 290 First, Washington State is acting as a "first mover," using its enormous purchasing power to transform the health care marketplace. The state's HCA purchases health care for more than two million individuals through two programs at a price tag of $10 billion annually. 1.8 million are enrolled in Washington Apple Health (Medicaid). Another 350,000 are enrolled in the Public Employees Benefits Board (PEBB) Program that covers eligible employees and retirees of state agencies and higher education institutions. Together, these two programs cover 30% of Washingtonians.
incentivizing wider use of certified pdas
The HCA already requires the use of certified PDAs in its PEBB accountable care organization contracts. Two accountable care programs are integrating certified PDAs at pilot sites. And the HCA plans to further promote the use of certified PDAs in clinical practice. For example, through a practice transformation support hub, providers will have the opportunity to participate in training to learn shared decision making skills, and receive technical assistance for implementation of shared decision making with the use of certified PDAs.
The second way in which Washington State is incentivizing the use of certified PDAs is by linking their use to enhanced liability protection for providers. A 2007 statute offers physicians a higher degree of protection against a failure to inform lawsuit, if the clinician engaged in shared decision making with a certified PDA. 291 Under Washington law, a "regular" signed consent form constitutes prima facie evidence that the patient gave her informed consent to the treatment administered. The patient has the burden of rebutting this by a preponderance of the evidence (showing it >50% likely that her consent was not informed). In contrast, a patient's signed "acknowledgment" of shared decision making also constitutes prima facie evidence that the patient gave his or her informed consent to the treatment administered. But the patient has the heavier burden of rebutting this presumption by "clear and convincing evidence."
In short, the use of a certified PDA offers clinicians added legal protection by materially changing the patient's burden of proof. In contrast to the usual preponderance of the evidence standard under which a patient would have to show that her consent was probably (>50%) not informed, a patient must instead more confidently establish (>75%) that her consent was not informed. 292 Linking the use of PDAs to legal protection parallels broader trends to rationalize and standardize medical practice by linking evidence-based clinical practice guidelines to safe harbor legal immunity. 293 Even more directly analogous experience with standardized written disclosures in Texas demonstrates that the incentive of exculpatory protection spurs wider use. 294 Eventually, shared decision making and the use of certified PDAs may become a new standard of care, such that failure to use them may be considered a deviation from acceptable practice and hence potential malpractice. Surely, more and more Washington physicians will use PDAs because of either state purchaser mandates or liability protection. At some point, using a certified PDA is what the reasonable Washington physician would do. 295 Nearly 90 years ago, Justice Brandeis advised that "a state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments." 296 Washington State is serving as the laboratory for PDA certification and promotion of shared decision making as an enhanced form of informed consent. Washington State is leading the way forward. Washington State's leadership in creating a PDA certification process provides a model that CMS can adopt.
Arguably, Washington State's model can be followed not only by CMS but also by other states. But Washington State is acting as a "first mover," using its enormous purchasing power to transform the health care marketplace. The state's HCA purchases health care for more than two million individuals through two programs at a price tag of $10 billion annually. 1.8 million are enrolled in Washington Apple Health (Medicaid). Another 350,000 are enrolled in the Public Employees Benefits Board (PEBB) Program that covers eligible employees and retirees of state agencies and higher education institutions. Together, these two programs cover 30% of Washingtonians. that seems like an imprudent long-term strategy. With 56 separate certification processes, PDA producers would face a "regulatory patchwork." 297 Instead, it is now time to build on Washington State's experience at the national level.
D. Federal Certification Is Coming
Federal legislation concerning PDA certification was first introduced in 2009. 298 The Empowering Medicare Patient Choices Act called for "a certification process for patient decision aids for use in the Medicare program and by other interested parties." To achieve this, the bill directed Department of Health and Human Services to contract with an entity to "synthesize evidence and convene a broad range of experts and key stakeholders to establish consensus-based standards, such as those developed by [IPDAS] , to determine which [PDAs] are high quality [PDAs] ." The 2009 legislation further charged this entity to apply the standards it established to "review [PDAs] and certify whether [PDAs] meet those standards." 299 While Congress did not enact the Empowering Medicare Patient Choices Act, key provisions from that legislation were included in the bill that ultimately became the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Most importantly, like the 2009 legislation, the ACA anticipated moving PDAs into practice by creating a certification process. 300 Specifically, the ACA requires the DHHS to contract with an entity that will "synthesize evidence" and establish "consensus based standards" for evaluating PDAs. This entity would then develop a "certification process" to endorse PDAs that meet these standards. But nearly seven years after enactment of the ACA, the Department of Health and Human Services has not yet implemented this PDA certification mandate. 301 Fortunately, a key funder of the Washington State program, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, also funded the development of national standards for PDAs and a process for their certification. 302 In particular, the Foundation funded the National Quality Forum (NQF) to convene a multi-stakeholder expert panel to define concepts for how to measure decision quality and shared decision making. 303 The NQF is a non-profit organization that works to improve the quality of the nation's healthcare system by: (1) building consensus about national priorities and performance improvement goals, (2) endorsing national performance measures and other consensus standards for use in quality improvement and public reporting, and (3) using education and outreach to help reach national goals. 304 Since its founding in 1999, NQF measures and standards have served as a critically important foundation for initiatives to enhance healthcare value, make patient care safer, and achieve better outcomes. 305 The NQF panel on PDAs convened in May and June 2016. It was able to efficiently build upon prior work conducted by both the International Patient Decision Aid Standards (IPDAS) Collaboration and the Washington State HCA. In September 2016, the NQF promulgated a draft report for comment. It issued a final report in December 2016. 306 But for broader healthcare policy waves created by the new Trump Administration, one might have expected the NQF publication of criteria and processes for PDA certification to prompt CMS to formally recognize them in rulemaking pursuant to the ACA mandate. Still, while not immediate, that result seems inevitable. At that point, other states, including Washington State, could deem PDAs certified for purposes of state law, so long as those PDAs were certified pursuant to the CMS-approved mechanism. Increasingly, those states and private insurers in those states will require clinicians to use certified PDAs as a condition of insurance reimbursement and for liability protection. 307 
Conclusion
Today, there is a discernible (albeit slow) shift away from traditional informed consent processes, toward shared decision making processes incorporating the use of PDAs. Indeed, the use of PDAs is perhaps both the most rapidly growing and the most promising means of addressing the failure of traditional informed consent. 308 The law is an important lever that can help reduce and eliminate barriers to the wider adoption of shared decision making and PDAs in clinical practice. Current and emerging legal incentives and penalties are helping to drive the evolution from a one-way, disclosure-oriented informed consent to a two-way, participation-oriented shared decision making process.
Since its origins in the early 1970s, the doctrine of informed consent has been largely a creature of the common law. Depending on the jurisdiction, the physician must disclose either what a reasonable patient would deem material or what a prudent physician would disclose under the circumstances. The federal certification of PDAs may soon displace these inadequate state standards, and impose much-needed consistency and uniformity to informed consent processes. We may finally close (or at least narrow) the persistent gap between the theory and the clinical reality of informed consent.
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